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AGEISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CARVALHO V. PORTUGAL
CASE (2017)
Eugenio Mantovani, Dr. Benny Spanier & Prof. Israel (Issi) Doron
Abstract: On July 25, 2017 the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR or “the
Court”) gave its decision in the case of Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal. The
Court found, in a majority ruling, that Portugal had violated Article 14 of the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits discrimination, as well as Article
8, which protects the right of private and family life. The decision came after the
Portuguese courts had reduced the compensation awarded for a medical malpractice that
had left her seriously impaired in her physiological functions and in her sex life.
While the Court reached, in our view, a correct conclusion, what is less clear is the
rationale that the Court adopted to address the case under article 14, and in particular,
under the different categories of sex and age. This case, as this article will argue, raises
an important human rights weakness within European jurisprudence: European human
rights law still fails to detect ‘age’ as a distinct and unique discriminating factor, even
when, as in the case of Carvalho, ageism, i.e. the process of systematic stereotyping and
discrimination against people because they are old, is clearly and unambiguously
portrayed.
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I. BACKGROUND
The ECHR makes no explicit reference to the rights of older persons as such. In cases of
discrimination, older persons find their way to the ECtHR under the "other status" category. 11 As
for any other applicant, they must prove that they were discriminated against in one (or more) of
the other articles in the ECHR. 2 They need to find "auspices" within the context of the
Convention's general articles –– and indeed in many cases they succeed. 3
Although The Court has not expressly addressed the issue of elder rights as a distinct legal
subject, it has showed sensitivity for the concrete conditions in which older persons live. 4 The
Court has decided cases concerning, for instance, death caused by poor hospital conditions; 5 the
disappearance of an Alzheimer patient from a nursing home; 6 the involuntary transfer of
residents from one care home to another; 7 The Court has also dealt with cases concerning: oldage pensions and adequate standards of living, 8 conditions and compatibility of continued
detention with old age; 9 the excessive length of proceedings; 10 the choice of preferred death 11;
and more. It is only in recent years, following the recognition of demographic ageing and its
social implications, that European legal researchers have begun to study the human rights status
of older persons as such. 12 Specifically, with regard to the system of the ECHR, three scholars in
law and gerontology studies, Benny Spanier, Israel Doron, and Faina Milman-Sivan, conducted
the first quantitative analysis of case law of the Court; they found that 1,503 out of 12,680 ––
approximately 12% –– of all the judgments given by the Court between 2000 and 2010 involved

11

ECHR, Prohibition of Discrimination, art. 14 (prohibiting discrimination based on one’s "sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status” but not age).
2
Spanier Benny et al., Older Persons' Use of the European Court of Human Rights, 28 J. CROSS
CULTURAL GERONTOLOGY 407, 413 (2013).
3
Id. at 410-11.
4
In 2014, the press unit of the European Court of Human Rights published its first factsheet in this field.
Eur. Ct. H.R., Elderly People and the European Convention on Human Rights,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Elderly_ENG.pdf.
5
Volintiru v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. 8530/08 (2008) (concerned a daughter’s complaint that her old mother
did not receive adequate treatment in the hospital).
6
Dodov v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 59548/00 (2008) (found a direct link between the failure to supervise
and elderly person and her disappearance and held that the legal system as a whole failed to provide an
adequate and timely response as required by the State’s procedural obligations under Article 2).
7
Louisa Watts v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. 53586/09 (2010) (concerned the involuntary transfer of a 106-yearold applicant by local authorities to a new residential home and was declared inadmissible).
8
Larioshina v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 56869/00 (2002) (concerned an elderly woman claiming that old-age
pension other welfare benefits were insufficient to maintain a proper standard of living).
9
Sawoniuk v UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. 63716/00 (2000) (case was deemed inadmissible and concerned an
elderly prisoner complaining that his imprisonment is incompatible with to his advanced age).
10
Jablonská v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. 60225/00 (2004) (concerned an 81-year-old’s complaint that the
length of proceedings regarding the annulment of a notarial deed had exceeded a reasonable time).
11
Pretty v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2346/02 (2002) (denying a quadriplegic woman a guarantee that her
husband would escape liability for his role in her assisted suicide).
12
E.g. Israel Doron, Older Europeans and the European Court of Justice, 42 AGE & AGEING, 604 (2013);
Barbara Mikolajczyk, Is the ECHR ready for global ageing, 17 THE INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS., 511 (2015).
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persons aged 60 or older. 13 Regarding the Court’s attitude to old age, this study found that
decisions regarding old age and the rights of older persons were not an essential part of the
Court’s evolving jurisprudence. 14 However, from a quantitative point of view, the ECtHR
appears to have allowed entry to older persons and discussions of issues pertaining to them, even
without making specific and direct reference to their rights as a unique and distinct social group
under the ECHR. 15
Within this general context in which, on one hand, older Europeans are not considered as a
distinct and recognizable social group but in which, simultaneously, the Court de facto deals with
the human rights of older applicants, the Carvalho case raised the question of the legal weight
given to age in the framework of the ECHR and in the decisions of the Court.

II. THE CARVALHO CASE
There was no dispute regarding the facts of the case. Carvalho, a Portuguese national, was born
in 1945. In 1993, she was diagnosed with bartholinitis, a gynaecological disease, causing the
applicant considerable pain. In May of 1995, Carvalho was admitted for a surgical procedure for
the removal of the Bartholin glands. 16 After being discharged, she began to experience intense
pain and a loss of sensation in the vagina and urinary incontinence; she also had difficulty sitting
and walking, and could not have sexual relations. After examination, Carvalho was informed the
left pudendal nerve had been injured during the operation. 17
Carvalho brought a civil action with the Lisbon Administrative Court against the hospital
seeking damages of approximately €330,000 in pecuniary damages and €250,000 in nonpecuniary damage owing to the physical disability caused by the operation. The Lisbon
Administrative Court identified both the medical malpractice and the causal link with the
applicant’s living conditions: As a consequence of the operation, Carvalho had difficulty
walking, sitting, and having sexual relations –– which, all together, made her feel “diminished as
a woman.” She was also having suicidal thoughts and avoiding contact with members of her
family and friends. The Lisbon Administrative Court awarded €92,000 in pecuniary damages and
€80,000 in non-pecuniary damages. 18
The hospital lodged an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against the judgment of the
Lisbon Administrative Court. Carvalho lodged a counter-appeal arguing that she should have
received approximately €250,000 in compensation. 19 In October of 2014, the Portuguese
Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance judgment on the merits, but reduced the
amount that had been allocated as pecuniary damage, setting the compensation for non-pecuniary
13

Spanier Benny et al., Older Persons' Use of the European Court of Human Rights, 28 J. CROSS
CULTURAL GERONTOLOGY 407, 409-18 (2013); See also Spanier Benny et. al, In Course of Change?
Soft Law, Elder Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, 34 L. & INEQ. 55, 72 (2016).
14
Spanier Benny et al., Older Persons' Use of the European Court of Human Rights, 28 J. CROSS
CULTURAL GERONTOLOGY 407, 417 (2013).
15
Id.
16
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 2 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 2-3.
19
Id. at 3.
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damage at €50,000. In the judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court, while reaffirming the
existence of a link of causality between the medical malpractice and the damage suffered thereof,
stated:
"It should be noted, however, that the gynaecological condition from which the
plaintiff suffers is old (existing at least since 1993) and that she had already
undergone various kinds of treatment without any acceptable result and that it was
that lack of results and the impossibility to resolve that condition otherwise that was
the motivation for surgery. She already had unbearable pain and symptoms of
depression before [surgery]. This means that the plaintiff’s complaints are not new
and that the surgical procedure only aggravated an already difficult situation, a fact
which cannot be ignored when setting the amount of compensation.
Additionally, it should not be forgotten that at the time of the operation the plaintiff
was already 50 years old and had two children, that is, an age when sex is not as
important as in younger years, its significance diminishing with age". 20
Before the ECtHR, Carvalho complained that the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision to
reduce the compensation originally awarded as non-pecuniary damage discriminated against her
in the fundamental right to private and family life, protected under Article 8 of the ECHR. 21
Both the parties and all judges of the Court recognized that the circumstances of the case fell
within the scope of Article 8. “The concept of private life,” explained the Court, “also
encompasses the right to ‘personal development’ or the right to self-determination and elements
such as gender identification, sexual orientation and sex life, which fall within the personal
sphere protected by Article 8.” 22 While the propriety of applying Article 8 was beyond question,
the claim of discrimination divided the parties and the bench.
Carvalho claimed discrimination on the grounds of sex and age. On one hand, she complained
about sex discrimination regarding compensation for men and women in similar situations. 23 The
applicant recalled two cases decided by the Portuguese judiciary where male applicants were the
victims of medical malpractice. In one case, decided in 2008, a man had been diagnosed with
simple inflammation of the prostate; in the other, decided in 2014, the victim had been
wrongfully diagnosed with cancer. Asa consequence of the medical error, both plaintiffs, like
Carvalho, suffered physical harm and had their sexual life was severely impaired. As Carvalho
pointed out, however, the male plaintiffs were awarded a greater amount in non-pecuniary
damages. Additionally, Carvalho contended that if she were younger, the national Court would
have awarded her a higher amount. 24
The State retorted that the Supreme Administrative Court had neither disputed the seriousness of
the damage nor depreciated the consequences on her private life as a woman. The Supreme
Administrative Court took into account her pre-existing medical condition, first diagnosed in
1993, and the fact that the victim had undergone various kinds of treatments without any

20

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13.
22
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 12 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659.
23
Id. at 13.
24
Id.
21
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acceptable result. 25 The medical error in the surgery actually aggravated an already difficult
situation; therefore, according to the State, the Supreme Administrative Court was correct in
reducing the amount originally awarded. 26
The State also rejected Carvalho’s sex discrimination claim, arguing that the fact that Carvalho
was awarded a lesser amount in non-pecuinary damages than the male plaintiffs in the two cases
cited by her was insufficient to show discrimination. According to the State, the situations in
those cases were, from a medical point of view, different from Carvalho’s. If the clinical
conditions differ, reasoned the State, the compensation for the physical and moral impacts
suffered should also differ. 27
The State also rejected the age discrimination claim, arguing that the allegedly discriminatory
language used by the Supreme Administrative Court –– “Additionally, it should not be forgotten
that at the time of the operation the plaintiff was already 50 years old” –– could be dismissed as
an “unfortunate turn of phrase.” 28
For the judges of the Court, the decision in the Carvalho case proved highly divisive, with two
judges joining in a forceful dissenting opinion and two others submitting separate, equally
resolute, concurring opinions.
III. THE MAJORITY RULING AND THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
The majority based its decision on the following key elements: The legal question, as framed by
the Court, was "whether or not the Supreme Administrative Court’s reasoning led to a difference
of treatment of the applicant based on her sex and age, amounting to a breach of Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 8." 29 In a more concrete manner, the Court framed the question as
follows: "The question at issue here is not considerations of age or sex as such, but rather the
assumption that sexuality is not as important for a fifty-year-old woman and mother of two
children as for someone of a younger age.” 30
On a factual level, the Court concluded that, "The wording of the Supreme Administrative
Court’s judgment when reducing the amount of compensation, in respect to non-pecuniary
damage, cannot be regarded as an unfortunate turn of phrase." 31 Rather, in the Courts view, "The
applicant’s age and sex appear to have been decisive factors in the final decision, introducing a
difference of treatment based on those grounds". 32
The Court laid out its ruling after quoting from two reports –– the UN Human Rights Council’s
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers and the concluding observations
of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) –– that,
in the Court’s view, highlighted the existence of sexist prejudices in the Portuguese judiciary. In

25

Id. at 4 (“It should be noted, however, that the gynecological condition from which the plaintiff suffers
is old (existing at least since 1993”).
26
Id. at 14.
27
Id.
28
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 14 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659.
29
Id. at 16-17.
30
Id. at 17.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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both of these documents, the government of Portugal urged to address the prevailing genderbased stereotypes in the judiciary.
As a decisive factor in the decision, the Court pointed out the blatant contrast between the
treatment received by the Carvalho, on the one hand, and the treatment reserved to the two male
victims in the cases cited by Carvalho and mentioned in the previous section, on the other. In
those cases, Portugal’s Courts, having established that the fact that those men could no longer
have normal sexual relations had resulted in a “tremendous shock,” one which greatly affected
their self-esteem, awarded a higher compensation amount for non-pecuniary damages, without
any reference to their age, gender, or whether or not they had children. 33
The concurring opinions of Judges Yudkivska (Section President) and Motoc reinforce the
argument of the majority that Carvalho’s case should be framed as one involving sex
discrimination and negative gender stereotypes. According to the Section President, Judge
Yudkivska: "For centuries a woman’s entire life was confined to the production of children and
to their care. “Kinder, Küche, Kirche” as the only permissible areas for female activity. A
woman was not respected as a human being. Her desires were ignored." 34 Hence, reflecting this
historical context: "[i]n the present case, it is clear that outdated gender stereotypes have
influenced a judicial decision and this in itself amounts to a violation of the applicant’s
Convention rights." 35
In the second concurring opinion, Judge Motoc clearly stated that, in her view, the Carvalho case
is “another attempt by the Court to deal with the question of stereotypes in the field of gender.” 36
Judge Motoc’s opinion starts by providing a description of the Court’s precedents in the area of
gender discrimination and stereotypes. 37 Applying this precedent to Carvalho’s case, Judge
Motoc indicated that she viewed Carvalho as the victim of two stereotypes: the sexual
stereotype, concerning physical and biological difference, and the gender role stereotype,
ascribing a certain role and behaviour to women. 38 Judge Motoc’s opinion condemned the
traditional idea of female sexuality as being essentially linked to childbearing purposes, which
she argued ignores its physical and psychological relevance for the self-fulfilment of women as
people. 39
Judge Motoc rebuked the criticism of the dissenters –– specifically, their charge that the Court
failed to perform the test of comparability. She noted that, in cases involving negative
stereotypes, the Court does not need to find a comparator. In stereotype cases, the Court focuses
on the stereotype as it negatively affects the group to which the applicant belongs. This means
naming the stereotype and contesting the harm that stereotypical treatment creates. 40
IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION

33

Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 18 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659.
34
Id. at 21 (Yudkivska, G., concurring).
35
Id. at 22.
36
Id. at 26.
37
Id. at 27-8 (Motoc, J., concurring).
38
Id. at 28.
39
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 29 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659.
40
Id.
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In their joint dissenting opinion, Judges Ravarani and Bošnjak disagreed strongly with the
methodology adopted by the majority. Specifically, the dissenters argued that, first, the majority
failed to prove discrimination on the grounds of gender under the Court’s own legal parameters
of validity, so that the decision appears not to be legitimate, but rather engaging in “politics.”41
Second, and more importantly, the dissent charged the majority with failing to recognize that the
Supreme Administrative Court made the importance of the applicant’s sexual life dependent on
her age, not on her gender.
As for the first critique, it is important to note that the Court applies two different rationales to
assess discrimination under article 14. 42 One approach is more procedural, adopting a three-step
test. The first step is to verify the existence of two relevantly comparable situations in which the
applicant is found. The second step is to identify a difference in treatment that creates a
disadvantage towards the applicant on the basis of suspect grounds. The third step consists of
assessing the existence of a reasonable justification for the difference in treatment. This approach
questions “certain classifications per se.” 43 Examples of such classifications include sex,
ethnicity, and disability, as members of these groups have historically been subject to prejudice,
resulting in their social exclusion.
The other approach is more substantive. It looks at any difference in treatment that affects an
applicant, and then questions its reasonableness and fairness. Under this approach, the Court
does not look for a comparator. The Court instead is satisfied to verify that the treatment is based
on a negative stereotype, prejudice, or assumption that adversely affects a group to which the
applicant belongs. The use of the stereotype must be embedded or lead to a 'treatment' –– i.e, it
should be more than a mere expression, but rather a concrete action or inaction that, directly or
indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, constrains the individual’s enjoyment of his human
rights. 44
In their dissenting opinion, Judges Ravarani and Bošnjak describe what the Court, in their view,
should have done. In their view, following the procedural approach, the relevant comparison was
between women Carvalho’s age who suffered from impairment in their sexual activities due to
medical negligence and similarly situated men. 45 The comparable situations should have been
further defined “in light of the subject matter and purpose of the measure which makes the
distinction in question.” 46 In regard to Carvalho’s case, the dissent viewed the treatment as a
factual decision concerning the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Thus, in
their view, the Court should have assessed whether, as a general trend, women are treated
differently from men “on the facts” –– that is, whether or not they are generally awarded lower
compensation for the relevant damage.” 47 This would have meant looking for similar Court cases
concerning the allocation of non-pecuniary compensation to men and to women, provided that
the relevant circumstances of the cases were substantially similar.

41

Id. (Ravarani, J. and Bošnjak, J., dissenting).
See Janneke Gerards, The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99-124 (2013).
43
Alajos Kiss v Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. 38832/06, 12 (2010) (concerned a provision of Hungarian law
that excluded people suffering from mental disabilities from voting in national elections).
44
Paul Quinn, The problem of stigmatizing expressions: The limits of anti-discrimination approaches, 17
INT’L J. DISCRIMINATION & L., 28 (2017).
45
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 35 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659 (Ravarani, J. and Bošnjak, J., dissenting).
46
Id. at 33.
47
Id. at 36.
42
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Here, an insurmountable difficulty arises: No two situations are exactly comparable, because in
every instance in which an adjudicating authority is called upon to estimate the amount of nonpecuniary damage, it must take into account and weigh carefully the specific circumstances of
the case. The comparability test is fraught with idiosyncratic conditions and elements that are
case specific and must be assessed to determine the adequate compensation for non-pecuniary
damage.
Given this difficulty, it is unsurprising that in the dissent’s view, the two cases involving male
victims of medical malpractice were not comparable to Carvalho’s case. As for the allegation of
negative gender biased stereotype, the dissent suggested that the majority placed too much stock
in the language employed by the Supreme Administrative Court, and wrongly concluded that
negative gender biased reasoning was the main rationale guiding the decision of the Supreme
Administrative Court.
The second argument of the dissenting opinion –– that the majority failed to consider the
allegation of age discrimination –– was more clear-cut. 48 According to the dissent, it is clear
from the impugned decision that the domestic Court did make the importance of the applicant’s
sexual life dependent on her age, not on her gender. 49 The dissent believed that, “For the
assessment of discrimination, the judgment could have tried to assess comparable groups of
persons in taking as distinctive criteria either age or gender.” 50 In short, the dissent concluded
that the majority plainly did not get the facts right. According to the dissent, the majority
incorrectly read the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court as stating only that the
“women’s sexual life is less important than that of men,” 51 thereby ignoring the more relevant
discriminating factor: the age of the applicant.
V. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
At this stage, having described the facts of the case, and both the decision of the Court and its
minority position, we would like to present a different perspective on the Carvalho case. This
critical perspective is influenced by the contributions of a legal scholarship that engages in
rewriting judgments as if we were judges. 52 More modestly, in this section, the authors ask what
alternative courses of action the Court could have pursued had Carvalho and the Strasbourg
judge viewed the case in the context of age discrimination. This review is based on the critique,
raised in the dissenting opinion and shared by these authors, that the majority ruling did not give
adequate weight to Carvalho’s age. As we argue, the ECtHR, in Carvalho, could have reached
the same outcome based not on gender, but rather based on age.
As mentioned earlier, in cases involving allegations of discrimination, the Court can follow two
approaches. The first is more procedural and consists of three steps: 1) identify the comparator;
2) establish a difference in treatment; and 3) assess the justifiability of the difference in

48

Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 40.
50
Id. at 35.
51
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 40-41 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659.
52
DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING JUDGMENTS OF THE ECHR 2-15 (Eva
Brems eds, 2012).
49
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treatment. The second approach is more substantive and involves “naming and contesting” the
alleged social group's stigma and stereotype. 53
Now, “if we were judges,” a preliminary step under both approaches would be to decide whether
age is or could be recognized as “other status.” In Carvalho, both the majority and the dissent
recognized age as other status for the purposes of Article 14. It should be acknowledged that this
position has not always been so clear. In general, states have a wide margin to use age as a proxy
to serve legitimate objectives, e.g., the age of consent to sexual relations. 54 However, the ECtHR
has acknowledged that age-based treatments can nevertheless be questionable from a human
rights perspective. 55 Legally speaking, then, the significance of age has been difficult to grasp.
Arguably the main reason for this difficulty is the dynamic nature of age. Unlike other grounds
such as gender, disability, or ethnic origin, age is not immutable, nor innate or inherent. Age is
constantly changing, and no one has any control over it. 56 Thus, age barriers do not actually
discriminate against another group (“them”), but make a distinction that concerns “us,” too,
when we are that age. 57
A few observations have been raised within this context. First, as the Court has recognized, it is
immaterial if the personal characteristic is immutable or not. 58 The “equal treatment” rationale,
mentioned earlier, questions the reasonableness and fairness of any difference in treatment as
long as it affects an applicant’s right under the ECHR. Second, the claim that because we all age,
age barriers do not actually create differences between comparable groups, does not take into
account the distinction, familiar to demographers, between an individual’s “age cohort” and “age
group,” and between “cohort effects” and “age effects.” 59 Put simply, the difference boils down
to this: A person aged 20 belongs to the age group 20 and to the age cohort 20, which is the
cohort of the 20-year-old living in any year –– whether it be 1960 or 1990. Now, the 20-year-old
in 1960 is not living in the same conditions as a 20-year-old living in the 1990. This is the result
53

See Janneke Gerards, The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99-124 (2013).
54
Dudgen v. U.K., Eur. Ct. H.R. 7525/76, 5 (1981), http://ceere.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016 /03/CASEOF-DUDGEON-v.-THE-UNITED-KINGDOM.pdf.
55
Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25762/07, 16 (2010), http://www.aimjf.org/stora
ge/www.aimjf.org/Jurisprudence_CEDU/CASE_OF_SCHWIZGEBEL_v._SWITZERLAND_Extracts.pd
f (“The Court is of the opinion, by contrast, that the applicant may consider herself to have been treated
differently from a younger single woman who, in the same circumstances, would be likely to obtain
authorization to receive a second child with a view to its adoption. Accordingly, the applicant may claim
to be a victim of a difference in treatment between persons in analogous situations”); see also,
Khamtokhu & Aksenchik v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 60367/08 961/11, 17 (2017) (“The Court notes that
“sex” is explicitly mentioned in Article 14 as a prohibited ground of discrimination and that it has
previously accepted that “age” is also a concept covered by this provision”); see Nelson v. the United
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R 11077/84 (1986) (stating “The Commission recalls its constant case-law to the
effect that age may constitute a "status" under Article 14.”).
56
AGE AS AN EQUALITY ISSUE (Sandra Fredman and Sarah Spencer eds., Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2003).
57
JOHN MACNICOL, AGE DISCRIMINATION: AN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS
25 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
58
See Carson and Others v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42184/05 (2010) 18-21; see also Clift v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R.
7205/07, 15-16 (2010).
59
Axel Gosseries, What makes age discrimination special? A philosophical look at the ECJ case law, 43
NETH. J. OF LEGAL PHIL. 59-80 (2014).
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of what demographers call the cohort effect: sexual habits, children-parent relationships, work
and occupation, technology advancements, etc. change over time. The two cohorts have the same
age but lived, live or are going to live in different cultural, economic, and social worlds.
Accordingly, the 20-year-old today cannot actually claim that in 45 years he or she will be in a
situation comparable to that of someone who is currently 65 years old. Third, it has been
observed that age, just like race or ethnic origin or gender, cannot be hidden. 60 It is visible in the
course of social interactions, and it may play a role in decision-making, such as in job interviews.
For this reason, some national legislations, such as in the United Kingdom, prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of age or the age one appears to have, i.e. the person’s ”apparent
age.” 61 In conclusion, both the Court’s case law and the arguments based on legal doctrine
gravitate toward the recognition of age as a suspect ground of discrimination comprised under
“other status”.
Having clarified this preliminary issue, the first step under the aforementioned procedural
approach would be to identify a suitable comparator. In this alternative age-based inquiry, the
comparability would involve “women of the applicant’s age impaired in their sexual activities
due to medical negligence,” on one hand, and “adult women younger than the applicant impaired
in their sexual activities due to medical negligence,” on the other. 62 This would frame the
question of discrimination as whether older women are treated differently from younger women,
rather than whether older women are treated differently from men –– which was how the
majority in Carvalho framed the question.
Second, a judge would arguably need to show that older women are treated systematically
differently. This would involve, for example, a showing that older women are awarded lower
compensation for non-pecuniary damages compared to younger women. Accordingly, the
plaintiff or the Court should identify two separate sets of decisions or cases –– one concerning
women of the same age group as the plaintiff, and the other concerning women who are younger
than the plaintiff. This research, focused on age groups, would be feasible and more
straightforward to conduct than researched focused on looking for cases involving men and
women, who are, from a medical point of view, in less comparable situations.
As a third and final step, the Court would need to assess whether the difference in
treatment/compensation has a reasonable justification. Note that the considerations under this
heading would be very similar to those that a Court would develop to name and contest an ageist
stereotype. Concretely, the Court would need to assess whether the use of the age of the
applicant as a mitigating factor was reasonable. The assessment calls to the fore the assumption
according to which sex life is less important when old. These authors suggest that, for this type
of assessment, a sufficiently robust course of action would be as follows.
First, the Court could present some pieces of gerontological knowledge about sex in later life.
For example, in a study on desire, activity, and intimacy in the older population, the majority of
people interviewed showed significant presence of sexual desire, activity, and function, even in
60

Olivier De Schutter. Three Models of Equality and European Anti-Discrimination Law, 57 N. IR.
LEGAL Q. 1, 2 (2006).
61
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031 art. 1, ¶ 3 (3)(b); see JONATHAN
HERRING, OLDER PEOPLE IN LAW & SOCIETY 36 (Oxford: University Press, 2009).
62
This alternative is in line with Judge Ravarani and Judge Bošnjak’s dissent. Carvalho Pinto de Sousa
Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 35 (2017), http://hudoc.echr.co e.int/eng?i=001-175659
(Ravarani, J. and Bošnjak, J., dissenting).
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later years. 63 More specifically, psychiatrists Gurvinder Karla, Alka Subramayam, and Charles
Pinto found that a significant majority (72%) of participants aged 50-60 were sexually active,
while a majority (57%) of the participants over the age of 60 were sexually active. Other studies
found that, while there is a reduction in experiencing sex and in its frequency as people age, a
significant majority of older persons continues to be sexually active. 64 This empirical reality
goes against the stereotypical social bias, held by many young people, that older persons do not
engage in sexual activity. 65
This is not to say that there is no decline in the level of sexual activity as people age; there is a
decline, and the percent of people age 65-74 that are sexually active is lower than of younger age
groups. 66 Nor does it mean that there is no gender difference, as older men are more sexually
active than older women. 67 Rather, the point is that attitudes and perceptions about sexual
relationships in old age are more important than the actual activity itself. Here again, evidence
shows that, while there is a gender gap, and a general mode of decline with older age, in almost
all age groups, the majority of men and women continue to believe that sex is an important part
of life. 68 According to specialized literature, sexual intimacy in later life is a “policy blind
spot.” 69 A study conducted across 15 European countries, called “Institutional Treatment,
Human Rights and Care Assessment (ITHACA)”, refers to sex in later life as a key item to be
monitored in their checklist of human rights in psychiatric and long term care institutions.70
Some countries, like Sweden, protect the right of older people to move into residential care

63

Gurvinder Kalra, et al., Sexuality: desire, activity, and intimacy in the elderly, 53 INDIAN J. OF
PSYCHIATRY 300-06 (2011).
64
Studies show that 83.7% of men and 61.6% of women between the ages of 57 and 64 are sexually
active. Alan Altman, Postmenopausal dyspareunia – a problem for the 21st century, OBG
MANAGEMENT (2009), https://www.mdedge.com/obgmanagement/article
/63486/menopause/postmenopausal-dyspareunia-problem-21st-century/page/0/1.
65
See e.g., Ashley E. Thompson et al., Young Adults' Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Towards the
Sexuality of Older Adults, 33 CANADIAN J. ON AGING 259-70 (2014); see also, Israel Doron, A
Perspective on Ontario’s Adult Guardianship Law: The Role of Law in Adjudicating Disputes Caused by
Old Men Marrying Young Women, 1 THE ELDER L. REV. 43-54 (2002).
66
Studies show that 83.7% of men and 61.6% of women between the ages of 57 and 64 are sexually
active. However, there is a decline as people age. Studies show that 67% of men and 39.5% of women
between the ages of 65 and 74 are sexually active. Alan Altman, Postmenopausal dyspareunia – a
problem for the 21st century, OBG MANAGEMENT (2009),
https://www.mdedge.com/obgmanagement/article /63486/menopause/postmenopausal-dyspareuniaproblem-21st-century/page/0/1.
67
Id.
68
Linda J. Waite et al., Sexuality: Measures of Partnerships, Practices, Attitudes, and Problems in the
National Social Life, Health and Aging Study, 64 THE J. OF GERONTOGY i60 (2009) (stating that 76% of
women and 93.8% of men between the ages 57 and 64 are sexually active or interested in sex).
69
See Isabella Aboderin, Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights of Older Men and Women:
Addressing a Policy Blind Spot, 22 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 185–90 (2014); see also
Bethan Everett, Ethically Managing Sexual Activity in Long-term Care, 25 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY
21-27 (2007); see Lyba Spring, Older Women and Sexuality – Are We Still Just Talking Lube? 30 Sexual
and Relationship Therapy 4-9 (2014).
70
See e.g., J. Randall, et al., Development of the ITHACA Toolkit for Monitoring Human Rights and
General Healthcare in Psychiatric and Social Care Institutions for the ITHACA Project Group, 22
EPIDEMIOLOGY & PSYCHIATRIC SCIENCES 241-54 (2013).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2018

11

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3

12
DORON: AGEISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
together with their partner/spouse, irrespective of whether the spouse is in need of care. 71 These
references indicate that, while sexual intimacy in later life is statistically less frequent, older
people nevertheless value sex in later life, and, for many of them, it is an essential part of their
personhood, independence, and wellbeing.
Second, in order to decide if the decision to reduce compensation has been fair, as opposed to
motivated by ageist stereotypes, the Court should address the concept of ageism. An alternative
judgement could make reference to the concept of ageism and the growing attention and
scientific knowledge around it. Since the late 1960s, there has been a growing body of
conceptual, empirical, and methodological literature that captures, measures, and explains this
social phenomenon. 72 It started from the first definition of ageism and has expanded dramatically
since then. 73 We know today, based on empirical research, that older persons experience biases,
prejudices, and discrimination based solely on their old age. Similar to other "isms," such as
sexism or racism, ageism transforms group identity and human fear for ageing and dying into
daily practices that can humiliate and harm older persons solely based on their age. 74 In
opposition to ageist practices and discourses, since the 1980s, a number of “soft” law instruments
have been discussed and adopted at the international and regional levels. 75 In Europe, for
instance, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in 2014, released a specific
recommendation on older persons’ rights, with the aim of promoting older persons’ protection in
societies where ageism is rising. 76
Third and finally, a judge would connect ageism and gerontological knowledge about sex in later
life. One could argue that the fact that, in general, older persons are less involved or interested in
sex does not justify the legal categorization of all older persons as different with regard to sex
life. Making a decision based solely on the fact that a person is a member of a group –– in this
case, older persons –– generally deemed to be less interested in sex means taking a decision
without consideration of the individual case. It is ageist. As gerontological empirical knowledge
proves, such is the heterogeneity of older persons and of the ageing experience that
generalizations based on old age should be taken with great caution. True, older persons are
statistically less likely to engage in sexual activity. However, on the individual level, older
persons are different in significant ways. They age very differently, and, for many of them,
71

See Hakan Jönson & Tove Harnett, Introducing an Equal Rights Framework for Older Persons in
Residential Care, 56 THE GERONTOLOGIST 800-06 (2016).
72
See AGEISM: STEREOTYPING & PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS (Todd D. Nelson ed.,
2004); see ERDMAN B. PALMORE, AGEISM NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE (1999); see Robert N. Butler,
WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA (1971).
73
See Thomas N. Iversen et. al, A Conceptual Analysis of Ageism, 61 NORDIC PSYCHOLOGY 4-22
(2009).
74
See Todd D. Nelson, Ageism: Prejudice Against Our Feared Future Self, 61 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 20721 (2005).
75
See Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/51 (Dec. 3, 1982);
Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, U.N. Doc A/CONF.197/9 (2002); United Nations
Principles for Older Persons, G.A. Res. 46/91 (Dec. 16, 1991); Organization of American States, InterAmerican Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons, O.A.S.T.S. No. A-70, June 15,
2015,
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/inter_
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and
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the
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Jan.
31,
2016,
https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32900-file-protocol_on_the_rights_of_older_pers ons_e.pdf.
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See Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)2 of the Comm. of Ministers, Doc. No.
CM/Rec(2014)2, (2014), http://www.refworld.org/docid/53fdc73e4.html.
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sexual life remains significant, and they continue to be actively involved in it at their own pace.
Thus, social norms, which seem to reserve sexual activity only for the young and vigorous, do
not justify discrimination against older persons. Further, in addition to the unhappiness this
social norm generates, the Court, in Konstantin Martin v. Russia, clarified that social norms
cannot justify legal discrimination of certain groups. 77
Against this background, the Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court’s argument that the
significance of sex reduces with age reveals itself as based on ageist assumptions. With this
finding in mind, our hypothetical Court would argue that:
"It might generally be reasonable to take into account a
claimant’s age when determining the amount of damages to be awarded,
as it is evident that a younger claimant will probably have to live with a
given injury for longer than an older claimant. It might even be
reasonable, in a case involving a physical loss of ability to have sex, to
consider whether or not a claimant is affected by the inability to have
children. However, it was both irrational and degrading for the
Administrative Court to speculate as to the applicant’s sex life in general
and to make any presumption in this respect based on a
generalisation.” 78
This is exactly what Section President, Judge Yudkivska wrote in her concurring opinion.
Regrettably, she did not analyze the case as involving discrimination based on age, but rather
looked at in the context of sex and gender.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed and critically discussed the decision of European Court of Human
Rights in the case of Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, which concerned a case of
discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to private and family life.
The analysis moved from the decision of the majority to view the case as another attempt by the
Court to deal with the question of stereotypes in the field of gender. The analysis of the
dissenting opinion, however, suggested otherwise –– namely, that the importance of the
applicant’s sexual life was made dependent on the age and not, or not only, on the gender of the
applicant.
Following this judicial analysis, the authors of this article attempted to imagine an alternative
ruling, one which looked at the case in the context of age, as opposed to gender, discrimination.
From this exercise, the main criticism of the Carvalho decision is that the Court gave too little
weight to Carvalho’s age; or, more specifically, that it failed to address the social construction
given to age by the Portuguese courts.
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Konstantin Martin v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 30078/06 (2012) (rejected Russia’s argument that the
division between men (i.e. breadwinner) and women (nurturers) was socially accepted in the country with
regards to the recognition of parental leave for male parents working in the army and stated that “states
may not impose traditional gender roles and gender stereotypes”).
78
Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R. 17484/17, 25 (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175659 (Yudkivska, J., concurring).
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The Court had a choice. It could have chosen to assess the discrimination on ground of gender,
age, or both. For the dissenting judges, the majority’s choice to base its decision only on gender
discrimination was the wrong choice, as it proved that the Court had failed to show the existence
of gender discrimination. Without having to agree with their result, it is our view that the
dissenting judges were correct in their criticism regarding the majority’s blindness towards the
element of age and to ageism and the negative construction of the right to sexual life in later life
in general.
In this sense, it is indeed disappointing to see how difficult it is for the Court of Strasbourg to
accept that categorizations based on age can be, in certain contexts, questionable from a human
rights perspective. What is more frustrating is how the Court ignores –– or simply unaware of ––
the growing gerontological knowledge, empirical findings, and scientific insights about ageing
experiences and about how prejudices, stigmas, and biases hinder the ability of older persons to
enjoy their human rights. After all, European citizens are increasingly older citizens, and what
these studies on ageing and ageism essentially say is that it is high time to acknowledge this
reality and fuel the discussion.
Are we sure that a continent whose population is increasingly old is creating the right conditions
for millions of individuals to spend their last years well? What do we mean by being old? What
do we expect? How do we view and understand the experience of ageing and of being old? What
limits do we put? It is high time that human rights law starts contributing, from its own
standpoint and according to its own parameters, to the new reality of ageing societies and
ageism. To do so, one must first acknowledge it. Going back to the Carvalho case, it is
impressive to see how, in their concurring opinions, the majority goes far beyond formal
legalistic literature, bringing in references to books, precedents, and human history in order to
justify their decision regarding the discrimination of women based on gender. It is thus so
disappointing that nothing similar was done with reference to old age or ageism. Hence, the
bottom line is that, in our view, the Carvalho decision was a missed opportunity.
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